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Articles
STEALTH TORT REFORM
Sandra F. Gavin∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread call for “tort reform” over the past three decades is a
calculated product of political rhetoric operating outside of the common
law. The very phrase “tort reform” functions as a political symbol “in
which both sides engage in lobbying and propaganda that contains some
element of real problems, half-truths, and outright distortions.”1 “Tort
crisis,” “litigation lottery,” “lawsuit hell,” “mad dog lawyers,” “runaway
juries,” “junk science,” “tort tax,”–all these phrases have been used to
describe the present state of our civil tort system. Considerable
scholarship has been directed toward debunking the basis for claims
made by the tort reformers. For instance, Professor Marc Galanter
published many law review articles aiming to expose the large gap
between the claims and the facts underlying the tort reform rhetoric
during the 1990s;2 scholarly experts have documented that plaintiffs
rarely win large judgments against corporations for defective products;3
the volume of products liability cases and medical malpractice cases
∗
Advocacy Program Director and Visiting Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law,
Camden, New Jersey. Prior to joining the faculty Professor Gavin was employed as a
public defender, defense litigation associate, and principal in a plaintiffs’ litigation firm.
1
NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 270
(1995) (stating that both sides cloak themselves in American values and claim that the other
side threatens democracy and the American way of life). See also F. Patrick Hubbard, The
Physicians’ Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the
Symbolic Importance of “Tort Reform”, 23 GA. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1989) (providing a review of
the opposing camps and the importance of symbolic issues in the general “tort reform”
debate).
2
See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells us About
Decision Making by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993); Marc Galanter, Real World Tort: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1996); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Michael
J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System–And Why
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
3
See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO
WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985) (this early study used information from
published jury reports in Cook County to compile the first, systematic statistical database
on civil jury trials and verdicts); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM (1995) (utilizing broader geographic data bases); Brian J. Ostrom et al.,
A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (1996)
(drawing on the database maintained by the National Center for State Courts).
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have not increased significantly;4 and, juries generally produce
reasonable outcomes.5
However, what has been called the “realist account”6 of the tort
reform movement is not the subject of this Article other than to note that
such scholarship has not stopped the movement’s proliferation.7 While
such realist sociolegal scholars rely heavily on statistical studies to
document how the tort reform campaign “radically distort[s] empirical
truth about legal practice[,]”8 it is generally recognized that the rhetoric
of the reform movement itself plays a major role in shaping public
opinion and in thwarting further judicial expansion of the doctrine.9

See generally DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3.
See id. (concluding that juries perform their functions reasonably well).
6
WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 7-8 (William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2004).
7
This Article is not concerned with the empirical battle in the sense of disproving the
tort reformers; instead I take the position that, in the absence of studies allowing the
conclusion that the reformers have drawn, common law should prevail. See, e.g., DANIELS
& MARTIN, supra note 3, at 58, concluding:
The rhetoric’s critics argue there is a substantial gap between the
image portrayed in the rhetoric and what the best available evidence
can tell us. This gap is much more a result of the political marketing of
ideas tied to that political struggle over which image of the civil justice
system will govern policy than it is a result of the limitations of the
empirical literature. Viewed in this light, the interesting and troubling
issue is not simply the fact that there is a substantial distance between
rhetoric and empirical evidence, but that the image portrayed is
accepted regardless of its veracity.
Id. See also Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 721-22 (1998). Galanter comments:
One of the accomplishments of law and society scholarship has been to
criticize and refute the body of belief I have called the jaundiced view.
Contrary to our expectations, error did not retire from the field; it
proved quite resilient. The kind of knowledge that law and society
scholars proffered has had some impact on courts and legislatures, but
it has not carried the day in wider popular or political forums.
Id. (citations omitted).
8
HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasis in original). See generally CARL T.
BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS,
AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW, THE CONSERVATIVE
CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW (2004); HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at
73-110; Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution In
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, (1991); Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Barry, Is
the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999); Robert S. Peck
et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397 (2000).
9
See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 8, at 792 (“More important than the reality of
an insurance crisis is whether the American public generally perceived an insurance crisis
and whether the perception was successfully tied to the products liability system in a way
4
5
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These contemporary reformers, often funded by the constituents seeking
to profit from their campaign, have succeeded masterfully in swaying
public opinion as they seek to roll back the common law.10
When the critics of our common law tort system fail to achieve all
the reform legislation they seek, they are increasingly successful in
winning tort reform by stealth–they covertly manipulate our civil justice
system and perhaps our perception of what is socially just.
II. THE “WHY” BEHIND THE “ORIGINAL TORT REFORM”
Strict liability in tort evolved during a time when three people were
killed every hour of every day from household hazards: color television
sets routinely caught fire; unglazed glass doors and walls sliced through
vital organs causing disfigurement, paralysis, or death; hot water
vaporizers reached scalding temperatures producing third-degree burns;
furniture polish produced an epidemic of chemical pneumonia;
dishwasher detergents contained pH values similar to values found in
lye; circular saws maimed thousands; and, rotary lawn mowers routinely
that could have reshaped opinion. It was; public perception of a 1980s insurance crisis is
undeniable”).
10
See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 174-76 (noting the various coalitions of drug, oil,
tobacco, insurance, chemical corporations, and trade associations funding the
“conservative attack on the common law[,]” including the American Tort Reform
Association (“ATRA”), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Manhattan Institute);
HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 45-49 (under the heading, “Financing Reform
Advocacy”); Stephanie Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance Industry
and the GOP Promote the Myth of America’s “Lawsuit Crisis”, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2004, at
18. Mencimer documents the funding by business groups behind the media’s “We All Pay
the Price” pro-reform campaign, and states:
One of the most influential of those groups is the Manhattan Institute,
founded by the late CIA director William Casey. In 1986, the institute
created its Project on Civil Justice Reform with funding from all the
same insurance companies who’d been responsible for circulating
bogus lawsuit horror stories. The project was targeted specifically at
journalists. In a 1992 memo, institute president William Hammett
explained the strategy, for molding reporters into a “pro-tort reform”
position, “Journalists need copy, and it’s an established fact that over
time they’ll ‘bend’ in the direction in which it flows. For that reason, it
is imperative that a steady stream of understandable research, analysis,
and commentary supporting the need for liability reform be produced.
If sometime during the present decade, a consensus emerges in favor
of serious judicial reform, it will be because millions of minds have
been changed, and only one institution is powerful enough to bring
that about: the combined force of the nation’s print and broadcast
media, the most potent instrument for public education–or
miseducation–in existence.
Id.
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sent a parade of patients holding bloody towels around lacerated or
amputated hands or feet to emergency rooms across the United States
every spring.11 In 1970, the President’s Commission on Product Safety
reported that some twenty million Americans were injured each year as
a result of incidents connected with consumer products.12 An additional
seven million injuries were reportedly connected to industrial products.13
Men, women, and children suffered devastating injuries from unsafe
products and neither negligence law nor governmental regulation was
up to the task of promoting safer products.14 Thus, before assessing the
validity of the contemporary tort reform movement, it is helpful to
revisit the “why” behind modern products liability in tort.
Nineteenth century tort law protected the interests of defendants in
general as well as particular categories of defendants.15 The principle of
caveat emptor as well as the doctrines of negligence and contract
protected the merchants, reflecting a “new nation’s devotion to
individualism and free enterprise.”16 The fault-based approach to
liability for injuries caused by products was a reflection of the nature of
society at large in the preindustrial era, when consumer transactions
generally took place face-to-face; it also coincided with laissez faire
political philosophy and principles of individualism that were prevalent
at the time.17 An injured consumer could only recover damages if it
could be proved that the merchant or manufacturer engaged in
unreasonable conduct. “Emerging industries and enterprises flourished
under the protective cover of negligence principles.”18 Obstacles to
See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, ANN. REP., ch. 2, 9-34 (1990).
See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY (1970), LIB.
CONG. NO. 76-600753.
13
See THE PRESIDENT’S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1972).
14
See Alvin S. Weinstein et al., Products Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12
DUQ. L. REV. 425, 462 (1974) (an early study of “new federal agencies for both occupational
safety and product safety” and their effect on product safety, concluding that “these
mechanisms [federal agencies], apart from the legal system, afford an incomplete basis for
adjudication of legal and economic responsibility”).
15
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 (2d ed. 1985);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 67-108 (1977); G.
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 61-62 (1980).
16
See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY 19 (4th ed. 2004) (for a
history of the doctrine in early products liability law).
17
See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.3 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter THE
LAW OF TORTS] (noting that during the Industrial Revolution, society firmly believed that
newly emerging industries deserved protection to promote expansion and that they would
survive only if they were not burdened with all the losses that they actually caused. Faultbased negligence principles promoted this social policy).
18
John Vargo, Strict Liability for Products: An Achievable Goal, 24 IND. L. REV. 1197, 1201
(1991).
11
12
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recovery developed from the often confusing overlap of contract and tort
theory applied to actions involving consumers injured by products.19
Social values as well as economic policies supported the promerchant era, and it was not until the middle of the twentieth century
that protectionist attitudes toward product defendants changed.20
Simultaneously, the recognition that negligence and contract principles
afforded the consuming public insufficient protection from product
related injuries emerged.21 In his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Company, Justice Traynor asserted that, while negligence was not
proven, it was unnecessary to prove, and further argued that “public
policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market.”22 Thus, “the original tort reform”
promoted social justice and product safety, evolving to rectify the harsh
doctrines that barred consumers from recovery.23
While this reform movement had its theoretical underpinnings in the
doctrine of enterprise liability as set forth by Justice Traynor in Escola,24 it
took an additional two decades for this theory to supplant contract
principles as a basis upon which to recover damages for injuries and to
control sources of products injury.25 Twenty years after Escola, a new era
See generally Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
[to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980) (for a summary of
the contract-to-tort approach underlying products liability).
20
See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 17, at § 28.27 (commenting on the social justice
underpinning; of product liability doctrine, it notes, “[p]ublic policy goals undergirding the
societal commitment to a notion of expansive manufacturer liability for defective products
could not be effectively realized in view of the limitations inherent in negligence or implied
warranty.”); Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 596; Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
21
Vargo, supra note 18, at 1202.
22
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463 (Cal. 1944).
23
See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384 (1960) (wherein the New
Jersey Supreme Court, prior to Greenman, eliminated the privity requirement in a breach of
implied warranty action, holding that the manufacturer’s obligation is not grounded in the
contract law of sales, but “upon ‘the demands of social justice.’”).
24
Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 453.
25
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 1916). Judge Cardozo allowed
Mr. MacPherson, who purchased his Buick from a local dealer not in privity with the
manufacturer, recovery in negligence despite the contractual privity defense. Id. Similar
cases were in the minority and limited to situations where it could be shown that the
purchaser or intervening seller would not inspect for defects. Id. Although MacPherson
was decided in 1916, it may be read today as a precursor of the strict liability standard
enunciated later by Justice Traynor in Escola and Greenman. Decades would intervene
while the contract approach generally prevailed. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort
Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 653 (1990) (“Enterprise liability, which posits that a business or
19
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for consumers commenced when, writing for a unanimous court in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., Justice Traynor rejected warranty’s
“timely notice” obstacle to the consumer claim, announcing that public
policy demanded that the burden of accidental injury be placed on the
entities who marketed them.26 Strict liability in tort was born, and
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402(A) followed in 1965 providing:
[T]he public has the right to and does expect, in the case
of products which it needs and for which it is forced to
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and
that the consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products. 27
Thus, strict products liability evolved at common law to implement
an important social policy: to provide greater protection to the injured
consumer than either contract or negligence law.
Defendant
manufacturers and sellers could no longer hide beneath the protective
cloak of traditional contract or negligence principles. Greenman and
Section 402(A) heralded the “original tort reform,” and the common law
contours of this legal doctrine developed rapidly over the next two
decades.
Legal duties more stringent than those imposed by
government regulation developed to protect consumers.28

activity should bear the costs of the harm it causes, provided the major impetus for the shift
from a negligence theory to a strict liability theory in products liability.”) (citations
omitted); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (tracing the history
of the doctrine as part of a conference addressing critical issues in tort reform at Yale Law
School in 1984).
26
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63 (1963) (Judge Traynor
wrote, “[t]he purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers . . . rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.”).
27
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c. (1965).
28
See, e.g., BOGUS, supra note 8, at 150-51 (arguing that while asbestos caused 170,000
deaths, the Environmental Protection Agency was never able to ban it, and lawsuits forced
it from the marketplace); Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 593; Weinstein, supra note 14, at 46263.
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Deterrence is a major function of tort law,29 and the doctrine of
products liability benefits consumers.30 “Primary among these benefits is
the deterrent effect that it has on negligent behavior and unsafe
products.”31 As Judge Posner has noted, “although there has been little
systematic study of the deterrent effect of tort law, what empirical
evidence there is indicates that tort law . . . deters.”32 Even those who
question the level of deterrence in tort law concede that it delivers a
“moderate amount of deterrence.”33 A primary social benefit of products
liability tort law is deterrence to substandard conduct, or, put another
way, an “incentive to beneficial conduct.”34 While the threat of liability
29
Webb v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d. 343, 346 (Vt. 1996) (stating that strict
liability “protects the consumer . . . by creating an incentive for manufacturers to produce
safe products, . . . or as other courts have stated, a deterrence to producing unreasonably
dangerous products.”) (citation omitted); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J.
1996) (“[t]he goal of deterrence, acknowledged generally to be part of tort law, is especially
important in the field of products-liability law . . . .[T]his state has a strong interest in
encouraging the manufacture and distribution of safe products . . . and, conversely, in
deterring the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products . . . ”); West Am. Ins. Co. v.
Oberding, 451 A.2d 239, 242-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (noting the deterrent effect caused by
product liability suits); Frank J. Vandall, Our Product Liability System: An Efficient Solution to
a Complex Problem, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 710 (1987-1988) (“. . . our concept of strict
liability has developed over time to make it easier for consumers to obtain compensation
from manufacturers or sellers when injured by their products”).
30
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 25-26 (5th ed.
1984).
31
Peck et al., supra note 8, at 436.
32
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
10 (1987).
33
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 443-44 (1994). Schwartz states:
Yet between the economists’ strong claim that tort law systematically
deters and the critics’response that tort law rarely if ever deters lies an
intermediate position: tort law, while not as effective as economic
models suggest, may still be somewhat successful in achieving its
stated deterrence goals
...
Nevertheless, even if tort law is only moderately successful in
deterring negligent conduct, this success has been largely
unacknowledged by the realist critics and has a major bearing on any
public-policy review of the tort system.
Id. See also Anita Johnson, Products Liability “Reform”: A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L.
REV. 677, 692 (1978) (stating “[t]he breadth and flexibility of the common law have
permitted it to effectively discipline the harmful effects of technology.”); Joseph A. Page,
Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO L.J. 649, 681-89 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988) (responding to Huber’s criticism of
the tort system “for ignoring safety disincentives that might flow from the imposition of
liability”)).
34
M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the
Lenses of Corrective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1034 (1998).
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may not be the sole reason behind safety innovations, scholars note that
it plays an important interactive role.35 Companies exhibiting “callous
disregard for consumer safety have been hauled into court,” resulting in
safer consumer products.36 Specifically, products liability doctrine
promotes safer product containers, safer product handling,37 and, in
particular, safer automobiles38 and pharmaceuticals.39 In 1983, the Rand
Institute studied the “serious public policy problem, namely the
manufacture of products that may have been unreasonably dangerous to
their users[,]” to determine what external pressures had the greatest
influence on promoting products safety and concluded, “[o]f all the
various external social pressures, product liability has the greatest
influence on product design decisions.”40

See, e.g., John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Safety, in PETER W. HUBER &
ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY AND SAFETY ON
INNOVATION 120, 180 (1991) (summarizing safety innovations in the automotive industry,
“[t]he case studies establish that vehicle safety is enhanced by the interplay of consumer
demand, regulation, liability, and professional responsibility.”); Schwartz, supra note 33, at
384-85.
36
Peck et al., supra note 8, at 438 (reviewing court cases involving the Ford Pinto and
Chrysler minivan and documenting the companies’ “callous disregard for consumer
safety”); Johnson, supra note 33, at 677. Johnson concludes:
Private personal injury lawsuits can help to control exposure to unsafe
products in addition to compensating injured consumers and workers.
Court decisions in these suits have played an active role in developing
manufacturers’ legal duties to the public and in providing incentives
for manufacturers to improve products and thereby avert future
litigable injuries.
Id. See also Marc S. Moller & Paul Indig, Products Liability Law Revisited: A Realistic
Perspective, 31 TORT & INS. L. J. 879, 881 (1996) (“Fortunately, and perhaps as a result of the
products liability movement of the 1960s and early 1970s, most American consumer
products are the safest available in the world.”); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding
Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 451 n.107 (1979) (quoting a newspaper article
describing the redesign of a vaporizer found to be defectively designed in McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 497 (1967)).
37
Johnson, supra note 33, at 677 n.2 (citing a series of cases forcing safer products).
38
See Graham, supra note 35, at 180 (citing a series of cases involving automobile safety);
Peck et al., supra note 8, at 437 (“One industry in which consumers have clearly seen safety
benefits derived from the tort system is the automobile industry.”).
39
See generally Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 35, at 293 (reporting that products liability laws and litigation
have a “marginal effect” on prescription drug safety, but pharmaceutical manufacturers
recognize that they can take steps to further contain risks and increase the safer use of their
prescription products).
40
GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION iii-viii (1983) (based on a study of large
manufacturers of consumer products which developed corporate level safety offices after
the 1960s).
35
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Collectively, the doctrinal “why” behind the original tort reform
reveals much about the social justice theory fueling the doctrine.41 While
a rapid proliferation of unsafe products during the 1970s and early 1980s
provided the social impetus for strict products liability in tort, the
common law played a pivotal role in refining a doctrine providing
incentives for manufacturers to improve the safety of their products.
Broader civil justice goals of product safety and court access were major
forces in development of the law.42 An early doctrinal basis for
promoting these goals was enterprise liability,43 and scholars debated
and disagreed on the “dominant” source of law for the dramatic changes
taking place.44 Was the dominant strand risk-spreading or riskdeterrence?45 If “strict liability” meant something less than absolute
responsibility and pure insurance, where did one draw the line?46

See, e.g., Madden, supra note 34, at 1096 (“[E]fficiency and corrective justice principles
operate and will continue to operate in a beneficial symbiosis, each a check and a balance
upon the other, with each as a necessary, but neither a sufficient, rationale for modern
accident law objectives.”).
42
Johnson, supra note 33, at 692.
43
See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1960). The majority of the
California Supreme Court utilized a somewhat tortured negligence approach to allow
recovery for injury caused by an exploding Coke bottle. Id. In his concurrence, Judge
Traynor set forth a more direct path to recovery, stating:
[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute
liability when an article that he has placed on the market . . . proves to
have a defect that causes injury to human beings . . . . [P]ublic policy
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products
that reach the market.
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
44
See, e.g., Critical Issues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles, A Conference Sponsored
by Yale Law School, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (1985) [hereinafter Critical Issues in Tort Reform]
(containing papers exploring the foundations of modern tort law presented at the
conference); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960) (providing a status report on the original
“assault upon the citadel of privity”); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 (1973).
45
Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1810 (1997) (“Currently there are two
major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely
at the goal of deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of economics. The
other looks at tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties.”). But
see Priest, supra note 25, stating:
In my view, the contours of modern tort law reflect a single coherent
conception of the best method to control the sources of product-related
injuries. This conception, which its proponents called the theory of
41
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However, while the debate raged concerning the parameters of the
doctrine, no scholar seriously contested the legitimacy of promoting
product safety or deterring substandard conduct. During this period of
rapid doctrinal expansion, inquiry into its essential nature and a search
for its proper limits continued. Professor John Wade articulated his
seven factors;47 Professor James Henderson ruminated on the
appropriate limits of manufacturer liability;48 Professor David Owen
critiqued a catalogue of rationales behind strict products liability.49 An
entire volume of The Journal of Legal Studies serves as a compendium of
the search for the intellectual foundations of tort law in general, and in
particular, for “strict liability in tort.”50
Despite debate among academics, court after court accepted the
doctrine of enterprise liability.51 This doctrinal expansion took place in
state and federal courts across the country under the guidance of the
judiciary. While this Article does not advance the choice of one correct
theory upon which to ground product liability law, it opines that the fact
that the doctrine has been the subject of great debate among scholars and
the fact that it expands and contracts is a reflection that the common law
is alive and well and doing what it is supposed to do. The scope and
volume of the debate indicates to this author that the experiential nature
of the common law process worked well during the evolution of the
original tort reform and that it developed exponentially, adjusting to
changing societal norms and fostering the broad civil justice goal of
promoting safe products.

enterprise liability, provides in its simplest form that business
enterprises ought to be responsible for losses resulting from products
they introduce into commerce.
Id. at 463 (citations omitted).
46
David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980).
47
See Wade, supra note 44, at 837-38.
48
See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 8.
49
See Owen, supra note 16, at 529.
50
See Critical Issues in Tort Reform, supra note 44, at 459.
51
See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 17 (listing cases advocating risk distribution ). See,
e.g., Priest, supra note 25, at 501; Madden, supra note 41, at 1034-55. Madden remarks that:
[t]he decisional law with virtually no dissent repeats a deterrence role
in accident law, without specifically assigning this result to the
operation of either corrective justice or efficiency principles. When
those disputing the vitality of a deterrence role achieved by decisions
tracking corrective justice principles are largely academicians, I am
inclined to side with the conclusions of judges who try the cases and
read the records.
Id. at 1034-55 (emphasis added).
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Given the unprecedented rapid proliferation of pro-consumer case
law during the period of doctrinal expansion for strict liability in tort, it
was not surprising that a pro-manufacturer backlash would ensue, and it
did so under the skewed and misleading label of “tort reform.”
However, this movement has taken place separate and apart from the
common law and appears to be based on social policies antithetical to the
policies underlying the “original tort reform.”52
Contemporary
reformers have taken their cause to the court of public opinion and the
very phrase “tort reform” has become a political tool used to manipulate
the judiciary and the public at large by depicting our tort system as “a
Mad Hatter world of avaricious lawyers, fluff-headed jurors, and
permissive judges . . . ”53 The lexical meaning of the phrase reveals that
its use has extended beyond its historical meaning as reflected in the
language of 402(A) of Restatement (Second) of Torts. The phrase now
seems to serve as short hand rhetoric for any perceived attempt by
injured consumers to invoke tort law.54
Stealth tort reform operates to manipulate public perception about
the state of the law without regard to truth or logic. It is not directed
toward promoting social justice other than to “change perceptions of
what the common good ought to be.”55 Most importantly, stealth tort
reform is not interested in truth; unlike the common law, it persuades
through assertive rhetoric and not through the give-and-take of orderly
proof and argument, but through manipulation of images and ideas.

52

See Page, supra note 25, at 654-55. Page states:
As history suggests, the old tort reform constituted but one swing of a
pendulum that later began to reverse itself in the wake of the crises of
the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, construed most favorably, the “new tort
reform” has become an effort to eliminate alleged excesses perpetrated
by the old tort reform and to restore equilibrium to the system.
Despite their apparent similarities, there is an important difference
between the old and the new tort reform. The former derived
inspiration and major impetus from the ideas of scholars and had its
primary influence on the courts. The latter is fueled by the economic
self-interest of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by
the tort system. In essence, the new tort reform is a political attack on
tort law in the legislative arena.

Id.
BOGUS, supra note 8, at 4.
See generally William H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 9 (1996) (dissecting the use of language as rhetoric).
55
Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on Twenty Years
of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV 1019, 1050 (2000).
53
54
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III. ASSERTIVE RHETORIC AND CONTEMPORARY TORT REFORM
Our common law is designed to “seek the truth” by an orderly
presentation of evidence in a court of law pursuant to rules developed
over decades to ensure that all sides have a fair opportunity to be heard.
Juries perform the function of factfinder, which is “to weigh the evidence
and decide the truth of the matter.”56 The common law places innate
trust in the reasoned logic of citizen jurors. Reason, not passion, is the
bulwark of our judicial system. However, “assertive rhetoric” is central
to understanding the clandestine nature of the strategies used to
manipulate public opinion while circumventing thoughtful application
of the common law. In addressing the nature of such rhetoric, F. G.
Bailey, in The Tactical Uses of Passion, An Essay on Power, Reason and
Reality, discusses and dissects various modalities of persuasion and
posits that our American culture champions persuasion based on reason
over persuasion resulting from passion when seeking to find truth.57
With regard to the modality of persuasion through passion he writes:
The . . . (direct use of passions) seeks to eliminate the
mind and the critical faculties. It provokes feeling rather
than thought. It is employed when the persuader
suspects that the logical steps in the argument will not
survive critical examination, or when he can find no
shared value that will serve as the premise for an
argument by reason. The appeal to emotion may be
designed either to create such a shared value or to
provoke a direct connection between feeling and action
without the intervention of mind and its capacities for
criticism.58
“Assertive rhetoric” is the term Bailey uses to describe a passionbased method of persuasion “directed to ensuring that only one side of
the question gets a hearing.”59 The reformers have masterfully engaged
in a public relations campaign of assertive rhetoric which begs the
question and is designed to ensure that “only” their side of the question
“gets a hearing.” Their campaign has been assimilated into our culture
to the point that very few recall the social and moral justifications for the
56
Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform:
Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 274 (1989).
57
See BAILEY, THE TACTICAL USES OF PASSION: AN ESSAY ON POWER, REASON, AND
REALITY (1983).
58
Id. at 23.
59
Id. at 124.
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original tort reform of the 1960s and 1970s.60
Rhetoric of Assertion,” Bailey summarizes:

443
In his chapter, “The

In short, assertive rhetoric inescapably must proceed by
begging the question: by simple assertion of the
correctness of one answer to the question at issue. There
is no other way of arguing about intrinsic values, for
these are ends in themselves. The speaker asserts a truth
by identifying the true believers who “happen” to be
those who believe that truth.
Accordingly, it is
inappropriate to ask whether an argument advanced in
this form of rhetoric is valid or invalid, and to test it by
the rules of logic. The proper question to ask about
assertive rhetoric concerns effectiveness. It is intended
to provoke attitudes of approval or disapproval, to
compel assent, to bring people over to one’s own side.61
Bailey focuses on the rhetorical devices that are directed toward
ensuring that only one side of the question gets a hearing, including:
ethos, the invocation of authority, the uses of fright, the focus on
personalities, and the significance of the vivid example.62 These
heresthetical devises eliminate logic by structuring the dialogue (or lack
thereof) so people will want to join the campaign or will feel forced by
circumstances to align with the argument without question.63 While
“logic” is concerned with the truth value of language, “rhetoric” and
“heresthetic” are concerned with the persuasion and strategy value;64 the
See HALTOM& MCCANN, supra note 6.
See BAILEY, supra note 57, at 135-36.
62
See BAILEY, supra note 57, at 123-43.
63
RIKER, supra note 54. Writing in the political science arena, Riker invented the term
“heresthetic[,]” stating:
“Heresthetic” is a word I coined from a Greek root for choosing and
deciding, and I use it to describe the art of setting up situations–
composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose–
in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled
by the structure of the situation to support the heresthetician’s
purpose.
Id.
64
WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION x (1986). Riker states:
the traditional liberal arts of language are logic, rhetoric, and grammar
. . . Logic is concerned with the truth-value of sentences. Grammar is
concerned with the communication-value of sentences. Rhetoric is
concerned with the persuasion value of sentences. And heresthetic is
concerned with the strategy-value of sentences. In each case, the art
involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at
truth, to communicate, to persuade, and to manipulate.
60
61
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reformers strategize to obscure the truth by manipulating the game, by
moving the battle from the court of law to the court of public opinion.
This is the essence of tort reform by stealth.
The late William H. Riker, in many of his last writings, including his
posthumously published The Strategy of Rhetoric, observes that “[t]he line
between heresthetic (manipulation) and rhetoric (persuasion) is wavy
and uncertain . . .”65 In conducting studies of communications in
political campaigns, he concludes that “heresthetic and rhetoric are
inseparably linked and must be analyzed together.”66 Contemporary
tort reformers have masterfully maneuvered much of the reform debate
to the political arena, discrediting the common law along the way. They
have endeavored to re-shape public perception and the way the
American public conceives justice. Law and society scholars have
debunked the claims of the contemporary tort reformers. However, the
attack on our civil justice system persists. The attack must be examined
from a political perspective in order to distill perception from reality.
Today’s reformers strategically rely on the heresthetic to ensure that
their view–and only their view–gets a hearing, bypassing the due
process safeguards in place in the law courts.
A. The Ethos of Stealth Tort Reform
1.

Crisis Labeling and Fear Mongering
[I]n a political context the content of the talk seems to be
irrelevant, as is its logic and its responsiveness to issues
and questions. It is as though any verbal display,
especially if it is delivered with style and flair,
encourages audiences to believe in the speaker’s
competence and in his or her likelihood to deal with
governmental issues in ways that benefit the audience.
An occasional memorable or quotable phrase seems to
be more persuasive that an argument that is empirically
and logically impeccable and thorough.67

The contemporary “torts crisis” evolved not through empirically and
logically impeccable arguments responsive to issues and questions, but
as a result of reformers manipulating the public mood through strategic
Id.
65
66
67
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use of the media financed by business interests.68 Advertising strategies
designed to influence the public mood were built around the
“memorable phrase[,]” utilizing appeals to passion through advertising
devises directed to ensuring that only one side of the question got a
hearing.69 Manufacturers whose liability insurance premiums suddenly
soared,70 invoked the threat of danger and characterized the perceived
problem as a “products liability crisis.”71 Hand-picked reports designed
to show just one side of the story (“out of control” claims in which
plaintiffs won large verdicts for seemingly small or nonexistent wrongs)
produced positive results for their industry sponsors. Commentators
soon noted that a “tort explosion” was undermining Corporate
America.72 The crisis label rhetorically mandated a call to action, forcing
the public to align without question. It spread rapidly beyond products
liability until a full-blown “torts crisis” was perceived.73 Advocates of
this mentality eventually succeeded in vesting the very term “tort
reform” with a politically useful, if skewed, meaning.74
The labeling of the situation as a “crisis” is yet another example of
the heresthetic in which the structure of the argument compels “even
those who do not wish to do so. . . to support the heresthetician’s
purpose.”75 Indeed, the very term “crisis” invokes a threat that the
public must rally around and face together. “More powerfully, perhaps,
than any other political term, it suggests a need for unity and for

See, e.g., MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION,
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 194 (2000) (noting a strategic shift among business interests
and stating, when it comes to unifying issues like tort reform, the most effective strategy
involves shaping “public mood”).
69
See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 39-46.
70
See VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 269 (commenting on plausible explanations for the
“insurance crisis” such as “increases in legitimate malpractice claims or bad economic
forecasting by liability insurers that forced them to raise insurance rates”); Jay Angoff,
Falling Claims and Rising Premiums in the Medical Malpractice Insurance Industry,
http://www.centerjd.org/ANGOFFReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) (documenting a
correlation between poor industry investments and increasing med-mal premiums).
71
See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 49 (documenting the media coverage of
the “insurance or liability crisis” reported as “a new national crisis.”) (citations omitted).
72
Id. at 47 (documenting the use of the term “litigation explosion” in the media
beginning in the mid 1980s and chosen as the title for Walter Olson’s book).
73
Id. at 49.
74
Id. at 651.
75
RIKER, supra note 54, at 9.
68
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common sacrifice.”76 Such crisis labeling is a rhetorical tactic utilized for
political blame shifting:77
By calling a situation a crisis, and by identifying certain
causes, the labeler can disavow responsibility for its
occurrence and mask the true recurring nature of the socalled unique phenomenon.
With respect to the
insurance crisis, the problem may be rooted in the
industry’s boom and bust cycle. By labeling the
situation a crisis, however, the critics focus the debate on
causes outside the industry itself. 78
In response to the rhetorically created crisis, the reformers garner public
support in debating how to best engage in “crisis management.”79
Playing on public fears of ever-elevating medical costs, the reformers
turned to the issue of medical malpractice insurance, inciting fear that a
rash of lawsuits would leave Americans without access to doctors or lifesaving products.80 The reformers chose their rhetoric carefully; labels
like “litigation mentality” and “lawsuit lottery” have considerable
salience for Americans who value self sufficiency, calling for a return to
the days of personal responsibility where the public is cautioned to
refrain from filing lawsuits.81
A Newsweek cover story captures the rhetorical fear-mongering tactic
wherein it warned, “Doctors. Teachers. Coaches. Ministers. They all
MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT
FAIL 45 (1977).
77
Id. at 45-47.
78
See Daniels, supra note 56, at 276.
79
EDELMAN, supra note 76, at 47 (stating that in response to a semantically created crisis,
“crisis management” is a way to build public support).
80
See Bruce A. Finzen & Brooke B. Tassoni, Regulation of Consumer Products: Myth, Reality
and the Media, 11 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 524 (2002). Finzen and Tassoni state:
[The reformers] have endeavored to sell the public on the notion that
the legal system has been overtaken by money-grubbing trial lawyers
who manipulate junk science to demonize life-saving drugs and
destroy the companies that make them.- They have also attempted to
sell the public on the idea that a litigation explosion threatens to
bankrupt the innocent, deprive the world of life-saving products, and
line the pockets of plaintiffs’ lawyers with ill-gotten gains.- To sell the
public on the idea that immediate reform must take place before
society pays too great a price.
Id.
81
See Daniel J. Page, The All American Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998
(advertisement).
76
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share a common fear: being sued on the job. Our litigation nation—and
a plan to fix it”82 The article claimed that the country is suffering from
an “onslaught of litigation” and featured tales in support of its claim that
America’s desire to “win a jackpot from a system that allows
sympathetic juries to award plaintiffs not just real damages . . . but
millions more for the impossible-to-measure ‘pain and suffering’ and
highly arbitrary ‘punitive damages.’”83 While a tremendous amount of
empirical study contradicts many of the claims of the “crisis[,]”84 none of
it was included in the Times or Newsweek stories. The graphic cover story
appealing to fear and common sense simply illustrates the obvious, and
the perception that follows is that, “[a]s a result of such dire
consequences, the civil justice system needs change and people should,
indeed must, support those changes.”85 It is not just the reformers that
suffer from the crisis, but, as the insurance industry public relations
campaign claims, “‘we all pay the price.’”86 This crisis-labeling is a
symbolic and emotionally charged appeal to unexamined assumptions,
and empirical data is not likely to defeat such claims.87 As Walter Olson,
author of The Litigation Explosion,88 related in response to criticism that
evidence of a litigation explosion was lacking–it’s the stories that really
matter, not the empirical data.89
2.

Myths, Urban Legends, and the Demons: Lawyers, Victims, and
Juries

Media mogul, Steven Brill, first wrote about litigation myths in the
media as early as 1986. He researched the archives of stories appearing
in Time, The Economist, Forbes, and the television show 60 Minutes and
found that many of the stories presented in support of what newscaster
Harry Reasoner called a “litigation binge[,]” were simply urban

See Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003.
Id.
84
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
85
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Between People’s Ears:”
Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 454 (2000).
86
Mencimer, supra note 10, at 18; see also We All Pay the Price: An Industry Effort to Reform
Civil Justice, 47 INS. REV. 58 (1986).
87
See Common Sense as a Cultural System, in CLIFFORD GERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 75 (1983) (stating that a common sense
argument “rests its [case] on the assertion that it is not a case at all . . . . The world is its
authority”).
88
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (targeting lawyers as responsible for a litigation explosion).
89
Diane Gale Cox, Tort Tales Lash Back, 14 NAT’L L. J. no. 48, Aug. 3, 1992, at 37.
82
83

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2008], Art. 1

448

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

legends.90 However, these legends, whether fabrication or distortion of
truth, mislead the public into thinking that they are representative of a
class of cases, that they are typical cases, when in fact they may be
aberrations.91 These stories take on a life of their own and catch on
precisely because of their heresthetic appeal. Anthropologist and law
professor, Robert Hayden, has hypothesized that such anecdotes
persuade because they portray a threat important to the American
cultural value of personal responsibility and tort reformers have utilized
such assertive rhetoric to appeal to this moral value.92 Urban legends
combine the moral imperative with dramatic examples that are easy to
comprehend.93 Thus, contemporary reformers draw on American
cultural norms and ideals, on what political scientist Deborah Stone calls
“motherhood issues[,]” issues that everyone supports when they are
stated abstractly.94 Urban legends serve as symbolic appeals to prejudice
and unexamined assumptions. The tales are simply common sense
illustrations of the obvious; if you believe in common sense, they must
be true.95 In the words of F. G. Bailey describing assertive rhetoric, “they
assert truths that they present as inescapable, defying argument, so
essentially true that they are beyond the need for corroborating
evidence.”96 The legends become fact and, as Bailey states, “[i]n rhetoric,
to proclaim something a fact is to tell the audience that they have no
alternative other that to give their assent, on pain of being excluded as
crazy people.”97
By the mid-1990s, reform rhetoric began to sway public opinion in a
broader way by demonizing the personal injury trial lawyer.98 The
rhetoric accused lawyers of everything from stirring up “[f]alse
[i]llness[es]”99
to
attempting
to
“bypass . . . democracy.”100
See generally Steven Brill & James Lyons, The Not So Simple Crisis, N.J. L.J., May 15,
1986, at 1.
91
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System–And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
92
See Robert M. Hayden, Neocontract Polemics and Unconscionable Scholarship, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 863 (1990).
93
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 44 (recounting many of the urban legends such as
the “The Pinto and the Horse,” “The Ladder in the Manure,” “The Drunk in the Phone
Booth,” and “The Fat Man and the Lawnmower.”).
94
Deborah Stone, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 12 (1997).
95
See Gertz, supra note 87.
96
BAILEY, supra note 57, at 125.
97
Id. at 132.
98
See generally OLSON, supra note 8; BAILEY, supra note 57, at 139 (noting that assertive
rhetoric “tends to focus on persons rather than just on deeds”).
99
Michael Fumento, How the Media and Lawyers Stir Up False Illness,
http://www.fumento.com/illness.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
90
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Contemporary reformers claim that “[p]ersonal injury lawsuits and other
tort claims represent a $40 billion per year industry built upon the abuse
and misuse of America’s legal system by contingency-fee lawyers.”101 By
putting a personal face on the fear-mongering claims, those making the
claims attach blame to the actor, encouraging the audience to make a
judgment about the character of those doing the deed (the lawyers filing
the lawsuits), rather than allowing the facts to speak for themselves. 102
This rhetoric of assertion is promoting a return to a traditional
contract and negligence-based products liability system. The movement
seeks to return the burden of accidental injuries caused by products to
the consumer, insulating those who market them from liability–a
repudiation of the doctrinal theory fueling the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and theories supporting post-Restatement expansion.103 Unlike the
common law process out of which the original reform evolved, this
political movement, by its very nature, does not invite discussion. A
return to the moral imperative of individual responsibility is touted
today by reformers seeking pro-business legislation. However, the
rhetoric presents only one side of the issue and fails to address either
product safety or business accountability:
By publicizing all the horrors of the tort system, they
[the reformers] get a lot done. . . . You pass legislation
that curbs their liability–that’s the ultimate prize. But
short of that, you affect juries, you affect elected officials,
you affect judges, you affect the entire discourse of the
United States.104
The success of the reform movement lies in the mindset of the judiciary
and the public at large; however, much of the public at large no longer

100

Walter K. Olson, Plaintiffs Lawyers Take Aim at Democracy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at

A26.
Institute for Legal Reform, Trial Lawyers’ Influence, www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
issues/issue.cfm?issue=TLI (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
102
See BAILEY, supra note 57, at 139-40.
103
See John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a “New
Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects–A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 507 (1996) (for an in depth discussion of the
American Law Institute’s movement from “[p]ro -consumer to [p]ro- manufacturer’” as
embodied in the drafting of Restatement (Third) of Torts, despite its lack of consensus at
common law).
104
See Dan Zegart, The Right Wing’s Drive for ‘Tort Reform’, THE NATION, Oct. 25, 2004, at
18 (quoting Pamela Gilbert, a lobbyist for plaintiff’s lawyers).
101
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remembers the policies that drove our legal system to implement the
original Restatement.
IV. JURIES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Our common law legal system is based on principles and the rule of
law. While formal legal rules define the causes of action and the legal
procedures, the broader common law is shaped by the attitudes the
jurors bring with them, not only when deciding an individual case, but
also on future cases: “By casting its shadow over the negotiation and
settlement process, the jury influences the actions of present and future
litigants and their attorneys.”105 The result may be a manipulation of our
underlying cultural assumptions or what anthropologist Robert Hayden
calls our “common sense” concerning our civil justice system and how it
works.106 The rhetorical threats to the American democratic way of life
“may have affected potential jurors, who are, after all, consumers. The
publicity may have influenced their decisions about damage awards for
many years to come.”107
Further, jurors themselves are affected and influenced by assertive
rhetoric,108 and the heresthetic appeal to personal responsibility may be
depriving litigants of a fair impartial trial.109 One researcher labels this
“jury shadows[;]”110 another explains that, “[d]eliberating in the
shadows . . . jurors often viewed themselves as responsible for returning
105
Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 111 (1992).
106
See Robert Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and
the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, Inst. For Legal Studies, Working Papers
Series 9 (1989).
107
Edith Greene et al., Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 808 (1990).
108
See Hans & Lofquist, supra note 105, at 111-12 (finding this additional aspect of jury
shadows in their study). Hans states:
Jurors themselves are affected and influenced by other juries’ decisions
in a number of ways. The jurors we interviewed appeared to be quite
cognizant of other civil juries, real and apocryphal. Their concerns
about deep pockets, the litigation crisis, and the integrity of plaintiffs
were implicitly and explicitly linked to the presumed excesses of
antecedent juries.
Id.
109
See, e.g., Eugene Pavalon, The Insurance Industry: Do Its Ads Undermine Jury Impartiality,
75 A.B.A. J. 46 (1989) (reporting on Aetna Life & Casualty’s ad campaign on the subject of
law suit abuse).
110
See generally Marc Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury System and the
“Litigation Explosion, in MORRIS S. ARNOLD ET AL., THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY (1987)
(describing this facet of what he terms “jury shadows”).
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moderation and good judgment to the civil justice system.”111 Stealth
tort reform through manipulation of juror attitudes may have greater
impact on our civil justice system than implementation of formal reform
measures.112 The victim of this publicity may be our civil justice system
and a plaintiff’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to a fair and impartial
jury trial—tantamount to jury tampering wherein juries are conditioned
to sympathize with one class of individuals.113 In fact, there is data
supporting a thesis that the multi-million dollar rhetorical “crisis” aimed
at manipulating public opinion has prejudiced juries against plaintiffs
and has produced an observed pro-defendant trend.114
Neil Vidmar conducted a comprehensive study of the civil jury in
medical tort cases, concluding:
The widespread criticism of juries in medical negligence
cases appears to be based on anecdotes and on findings
fromseveral studies of jury verdicts. The data from the
studies do not allow the conclusions that have been
drawn from them because very plausible alternative
hypotheses that could explain the results cannot be
ruled out. The methodological critique I have offered
does not allow the inference that juries are doing a good
job; it only says that the evidence does not allow us to
say one way or the other.115

Hans & Lofquist, supra note 105, at 112.
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The
Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1802 (2002).
113
See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 1 (and accompanying text); Pavalon, supra note 109
(commenting on the effect of media campaigns on jury impartiality); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1484 (2007) (concluding that data show that juries
consistently sympathize more with doctors who are sued that patients who sue).
114
See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 8, at 739. Eisenberg and Henderson state:
The combination of dramatic increases in insurance rates [in the 1980s],
widespread reporting of the insurance crisis, a multimillion dollar
publicity campaign to link the insurance crisis to products liability
rules, and such rules’ effects on daily life, may have created the kind of
massive, widespread shift in attitude needed to produce the observed
pro-defendant trend.
Id.
115
VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 226. Vidmar’s purpose was “to empirically examine the
merits of the claims that malpractice juries deviate extensively from medical standards and
that they are a primary culprit behind the ills that plague the American health care
system.” Id. at 265.
111
112
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While Vidmar urges caution in extrapolating his finding about
malpractice juries to others such as products liability,116 he states
emphatically that his findings should raise very serious questions about
the reformers basic assumptions of jury behavior as well as their broad
indictments of products liability juries.117 In the same year Vidmar’s
study was published, Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin published their
study of juries based on data drawn from civil products liability and
medical malpractice juries from different parts of the country. Daniels
and Martin concluded, “We—and others—do not find empirical
evidence of a system run amok with skyrocketing awards, and so on.
Or, we find little or no empirical information available regarding many
of the claims made by the reformers about juries and the civil justice
system.”118
V. VICTIMS AND LAWYERS
Contemporary tort reform rhetoric not only covertly threatens the
right to an impartial fact finder in the jury box but may significantly
restrict access to the civil justice system and may affect the size of the
pool of lawyers willing to take on the injured consumer’s case. Jury
researchers Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, in a study of the market
effects of contemporary tort reform in Texas on legal practice, note,
“changes in jury verdicts–real or perceived–reverberate throughout the
civil litigation process because they help set the ‘going rate’ for settling
claims.”119 The perceived jury attitude in turn affects the economic
realities of private civil practice and, concomitantly, access to legal
representation. Because plaintiffs’ attorneys are the civil justice system’s
“gatekeepers[,]” their perceptions have a significant influence on the
civil justice system.120 In their study, Daniels and Martin detail plaintiff
lawyers’ perceptions of changes in the legal environment and separately
assess the perceived effect of “formal legal changes”121 and of the “tort
reform public relations campaigns.”122 The study concludes:

Id. at 274.
Id. at 273; see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 85, at 456-82 (detailing the effects of tort
reform on jury attitudes and awards).
118
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at ix-x.
119
See Daniels & Martin, supra note 112 (conclusions drawn from ninety-six in-depth
interviews and 554 survey responses of plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas).
120
See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fees Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil
Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997).
121
Daniels & Martin, supra note 112, at 1797.
122
Id. at 1802-03, Table 6a, Table 6b.
116
117
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Interestingly, rather than changes in formal law, it is
events which affect the broader legal environment that
seem to have the greatest impact on plaintiffs’ practices.
. . . [T]he tort reform public relations campaign and the
decisions of the Texas Supreme Court are perceived as
having the greatest negative influence on plaintiffs’
lawyers’ practices, much more so than any . . . specific,
formal legal changes . . . The state supreme court and the
public relations campaigns impact the everyday
working environment, in lawyers’ eyes, by affecting the
jury or the jury pool. Perceptions about juries and jury
behavior are central to the way plaintiffs’ lawyers
perceive their working environment and construct their
practices . . . . The public relations campaigns that have
touted tort reform are seen as especially pernicious
because of their supposed direct effect on the jury
pool . . . and creating massive misinformation.123
The perception of the gatekeeper to the civil justice system may play
a greater role in shaping our civil justice system than any formal legal
reform. This perception will determine whether, and for whom, the law
will work in practice.124 It is the perceptions that rule: in the aftermath of
three decades of assertive rhetoric, public opinion is under the
perception that there is a tort litigation crisis and perception is
manipulating access to legal process. Truth is irrelevant.
VI. THE JUDICIARY
A pro-defendant “quiet revolution” taking place in the courts was
documented by Professors Henderson and Eisenberg based on product
liability claims filed in 1990. Henderson and Eisenberg demonstrated
that courts had begun to reject–or at least resist expansion of many of the
doctrines underlying the “original tort reform.”125 Since that study, the
judiciary continues to waiver on its commitment to original doctrinal
underpinnings of products liability law. The judiciary is not immune to
the forces shaping public opinion and the electorate. However, there are
signs that the judiciary is retreating from its commitment to promoting

Id. at 1802.
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “It’s Darwinism—Survival of the Fittest:” How
Markets and Reputations Shape the Way in Which Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 J. L. &
POL’Y 377 (1999).
125
See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 793.
123
124
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safety through enforcement and/or expansion of products liability
doctrine.
The first and foremost change in attitude emanated from the court
where it all began, the California Supreme Court,126 signaling a
significant retreat from Justice Traynor’s original thesis as expressed in
Escola and Greenman.127 In Brown,128 a 1988 drug case, and in Anderson,129
a 1991 asbestos case, the court referenced the rhetoric of the defendants
and made an about face on the “deterrence issue,” or from the point of
view of the reformers, “overdeterrence.”130 The California court, once at
the forefront of developing consumer protection law, adopted a liability
standard more favorable to defendants than most other states.131 While
only a small minority of jurisdictions exempt all prescription drugs from
liability,132 the fact that the California Supreme Court is leading the rollback foreshadows a not-so-subtle change in judicial commitment to the
safety enhancing doctrine underlying the “original tort reform.”
In Brown, the California Supreme Court held that strict liability
would be inapplicable to all prescription drug failure to warn claims,
reasoning that the holding was necessary on public policy grounds in
order to avoid deterring drug manufacturers from developing and
marketing new drugs and to foster reasonably priced prescription drugs.
The court surmised that “if” drug manufacturers could not count on
limiting their liability to risks that were known or knowable at the time
of manufacture or distribution, they “might” be discouraged from
126
Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972) (illustrating California’s
tradition of being on the cutting-edge of products liability doctrine expanding consumer
rights); Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (same); see also Sindell v. Abbott
Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (in which California became
the first court to recognize market share liability).
127
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963).
128
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
129
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
130
See generally Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L.
REV. 303, 314 (1992) (for a discussion of reformers complaint of “overdeterrence” by a
product liability system which is thwarting research and development of products and
driving products off the market).
131
See Castrignano v. E. R. Squibb & Sons. Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988) (rejecting Brown
and illustrating that most courts deal with strict liability and prescription drugs on a caseby-case basis); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (same); White v. Wyeth
Lab., 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988) (same); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293
(D. Minn. 1988) (same); Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 97 N.J. 429 (1984) (same). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
132
See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 470; Lindsey v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying New York law); Mckee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Terhune v. A.H.
Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975) (Wash. 1978).
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developing new and improved products.133 In support of these
conjectures, the court relied on defendants’ rhetorical citing of a “host of
examples of products which have greatly increased in price or have been
withdrawn or withheld from the market because of the fear that their
producers would be held liable for large judgments.”134 Significantly,
the court also noted that the deterrence of strict liability with regard to
prescription drugs was unnecessary and inappropriate because the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) plays a large role in screening new
drugs before they are placed on the market,135 despite the realities of
today’s FDA’s drug and medical device approval process.136
In Anderson, an asbestos case, Justice Mosk, the California Supreme
Court Justice who authored the opinion in Brown, wrote separately to
criticize the majority’s reliance on Brown in extending its rule to nonprescription drug products, stating that the majority stretched the
holding and analysis in Brown beyond all recognition when it relied on
Brown in the asbestos litigation involving products other than
prescription drugs. Significantly, Justice Mosk warned, “I must express
my apprehension, however, that we are once again retreating from ‘[t]he
pure concepts of product liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured
by this court.’”137 However, despite Justice Mosk’s apprehension in

Brown, 751 P.2d. at 479.
Id. at 479-80 (relying on E.R. Squibb & Sons’s claims that Benedectin was withdrawn
from the market in 1983 because of the cost of insurance; that in the mid-1980s a producer
of the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine withdrew its product from the market
due to liability exposure and difficulty in continuing to obtain insurance; that
unavailability of insurance prevented a manufacturer from marketing a new drug to treat
vision problems). But see Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade
Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION,
INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 127-49 (Peter H. Scheck ed., 1991) (reporting that
the so called tort tax, even without factoring the benefits of promoting safety, is, at most,
two percent).
135
See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.
1980)); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (affording FDA approved
prescription drugs immunity from strict liability).
136
See, e.g., Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right
Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 530 (1988)
(“Virtually all observers, including medical device manufacturers, share the view that the
FDA’s resources are inadequate to meet its obligations under the Medical Device
Amendments.”) (citations omitted); Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470-80 (1996)
(commenting on inadequate resources in the FDA).
137
See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 561 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting). But see Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Cal.
1996) (five years later Judge Mosk wrote for the majority in a divided opinion rejecting
defendants assertions that the standard for failure to warn involving prescription drugs is
simple negligence).
133
134
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applying Brown’s public policy rationale specific to prescription drugs,
later courts extended it to products such as inflatable penile implants,
prosthetic heart devices, and Intrauterine Devices (“IUDs”).138
The California turnaround139 is perhaps the clearest example of a
court’s willingness to accept the rhetoric of the reformers by reigning in
products liability law based on unexamined empirical claims. However,
the unexamined public policy rhetoric of “overdeterrence” is seeping
into other court opinions.140 For instance, the Utah Supreme Court relied
on the public policy considerations of Brown in granting immunity from
strict liability design defect claims to all prescription drugs approved by
the FDA.141 The court granted the manufacturers immunity despite that
fact that “not a shred of evidence has been presented to this Court that
indicates that liability under the tort system has deterred pharmaceutical
companies from introducing new drugs.”142
Explanations for this changing judicial attitude may be a reflection of
the change in public opinion; after all, judges as well as jurors and
lawyers are part of the public at large influenced by the relentless
assertive rhetoric of the past three decades. Alternatively, in states like
California, where the judiciary is elected by a public bombarded with the
rhetoric of the past three decades, it may be yet an additional example of

138
See, e.g., Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying the
public policy rationale of Brown to an inflatable penile implant); Plenger v. ALZA Corp., 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that, on policy grounds, no distinctions
between prescription drugs and implanted drugs and IUDs existed); Stangvik v. Shiley
Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 179, 190 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“Although Brown dealt with the
manufacture of prescription drugs, the policy may also be applied in the case of
manufacturers of advanced medical innovations”).
139
See Bill Blum, Toward a Radical Middle: Has a Great Court Become Mediocre?, 77 A.B.A. J.
48 (1991) (citing California Supreme Court cases declining to expand plaintiffs’ tort claims).
140
See, e.g., Young for Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59 (Wash. 1996) (adopting the
reasoning of Brown, holding that when the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe product
fails to warn of its inherent defects, Comment k to Section 406A in Restatement (Second)
Torts imposes liability for negligence only, not strict liability); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,
813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (adopting a rule similar to Brown immunizing prescription
drugs from strict liability design claims, but only if approved by the FDA); Enright v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991) (citing Brown’s public policy favoring some
protection for prescription drugs); Shackil v. Lederle Labs, 561 A.2d 511, 512 (N.J. 1989)
(rejecting collective liability theory in claim based on defective design of DPT vaccine
holding that it “would frustrate overarching public-policy . . . by threatening the continued
availability of needed drugs and impairing the prospects of the development of safer
vaccines.”).
141
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
142
Id. at 102-03 (Howe, J. dissenting).
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the insidious nature of stealth tort reform manipulating the public
today.143
Public opinion is a construction of governments, of the media, and of
everyday conversation influenced by governments and the media,
although it is often accepted as if it were objective reality.144 The
judiciary must be circumspect in making policy decisions based on
rhetorical reality. The judiciary must demand more than assertive
rhetoric as a basis for retreating from its traditional commitment to
promote public safety through enforcement of products liability law
doctrine.145
VII. CONCLUSION
Stealth tort reform is changing our perceptions of the civil justice
system in twenty-first century America, and contemporary reformers
have masterfully conducted a political public relations campaign which
begs the question, and is directed to ensuring, that only one side of the
question gets a hearing.146 While it is tempting to challenge the rhetoric
by debating whether its claims are legitimate,147 political scientists
caution that questioning an argument’s form is inappropriate and they
urge that the proper question to ask about assertive rhetoric concerns its
“effectiveness.”148 If we accept this view point, it is difficult to argue that
the contemporary tort reform movement is ineffective and, as noted
earlier, the extensive empirical work of the law and society scholars has
done little to counter public perception. However, I posit that the legal
question raised by stealth tort reform is not rhetorical. Thus, the
question for debate is whether the contemporary tort reform movement
promotes the social values underlying product liability law. Does it
foster social justice?
This complex inquiry needs further study. On one hand, the
reformers may be right; in the twenty-first century, perhaps we have
returned to a culture privileging wealth maximization over individual
See OWEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 490 (noting that Brown was decided a few months
after three liberal California justices were denied reelection and replaced by judges with
more “moderate” views.).
144
See generally EDELMAN, supra note 67, at 52.
145
See generally Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (1999) (urging courts to resist reforming the common law
when applying tort reform legislation).
146
BAILEY, supra note 57, at 124.
147
See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
148
See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
143
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rights and the enterprise liability doctrine fueling the original tort reform
is no longer relevant. Although this explanation is beyond the scope of
this Article, this thesis can be supported by the law and economic
movement popular among tort scholars today, as well as erosion of strict
liability doctrine embodied in the American Law Institute’s Restatement
(Third) for products liability.149 However, if this is not the case, or at
least has not been proven to be the case, the common law doctrine tells
us that “the principle of fairness must have priority over the policy of
wealth-maximization.”150
The understanding of “fairness” in twenty-first century America
must be debated in a common law context where all sides have an
opportunity to be heard. Unfortunately, it appears that much of the
public, unschooled in the virtues of the common law process, accepts the
perception that America is in a “crisis” due to lawsuit abuse, that greedy
trial lawyers are playing a lawsuit lottery, that courts are clogged with
frivolous tort cases, that huge jury awards are responsible for
skyrocketing insurance premiums driving doctors out of business,
closing down schools sports programs, scaring the clergy out of
counseling their flocks, and even thwarting research and development of
products that society desperately needs.
From these rhetorical
assertions, it follows that the individual must take personal
responsibility and that it is “unfair” to invoke tort law. However, in
fairness, should not the shield of moral responsibility be applied equally
to defendants’ injury causing behaviors? Should fairness to victims be at
least as important as fairness to defendants, or have we as a society
changed so dramatically that the doctrine of Escola and Greenman151 is no
longer relevant?
What about product safety? In an age where federal regulatory
agencies are unable to protect consumers from sophisticated products
and corporate misconduct152 and where consumers injured by products

149
See John Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in the Restatement
(Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 21 (1993).
150
See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1380 n.257 (1997) (citations omitted); Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 103 (Howe,
J. dissenting) (wherein Judge Howe, after noting the lack of evidence in support of
defendants’ over-deterrence argument, which the majority relied upon, asks, “[w]hy
should those who are seriously injured or suffer because of the death of another have to
stand the expense of such losses to support the high profit margins of the drug industry?”).
151
See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
152
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REP.
11, supra note 136; BOGUS, supra note 8, at 150-51 (remarking that while asbestos causes
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can no longer rely on federal or state health care because greater and
greater percentages of the population are uninsured or underinsured,153
is it fair for injured consumers to assume the costs of injury from
products sold for profit in the marketplace? Are the social goals of
promoting safe products less important than when the original tort
reform evolved under the watchful guise of the common law? Do we
now privilege the market place over social responsibility?
Under the common law, facts become “truth” only through the filter
of the rule of law and upon application of the rules of evidence subject to
rigorous cross examination designed to expose hyperbole, bias, and
outright untruth.154 The “original tort reform” developed at common
law, its foundation grounded in legal theory, however imperfect,
evolved primarily to protect consumers from injuries caused by unsafe
products, regardless of how the theorists would define “unsafe.”155
While judges and jurors are the voice of the common law, the voice of
public opinion is “largely created by those who already wield the
greatest power and is then used to rationalize their actions.”156 Today’s
pro-defendant tort reform is a product of the common law’s antithesis
with its foundation in assertive rhetoric–the heresthetic. It is a product
of political manipulation. It is what Professor Feinman calls, “Politics by
[o]ther [m]eans.”157 It is clear that much of today’s “truth” about
products liability reform is a response to a semantically created political
crisis; it is a result of a war of words taking place in the media rather
than the courts. Its foundation is in impassioned rhetoric, often funded
by the very constituents seeking to profit from its agenda. The real
question concerning stealth tort reform is not simply whether the
contemporary movement fosters social justice, but whether stealth tort
reform has covertly manipulated perceptions of what is socially just.

170,000 deaths from lung cancer, the EPA was never able to ban it. Lawsuits forced it from
the market).
153
Underinsured in America: Is Health Coverage Adequate?, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID
AND THE UNINSURED (2002) (“researchers estimate that about a fifth of insured individuals
are underinsured”); FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 194 (commenting on decreasing forms of
government protection, including health care).
154
See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1 (2002) (“We want juries to return the right
verdict, and by that we may mean the truthful verdict, the one that accords with what
happened.”).
155
See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
156
EDELMAN, supra note 67, at 55.
157
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 189.
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